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THE COSTS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS 
AND FIRM ADJUSTMENTS* 
B U R T S. B A R N O W AND R O N A L D G. E H R E N B E R G 
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Concluding remarks, 538. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Empirical studies of labor markets customarily use the money 
wage as a proxy for the cost of labor. However, in recent years nonwage 
compensation, including legally required insurance payments, health 
and life insurance payments, paid leave and vacations, and pension 
fund contributions, has become an increasingly important share of 
total labor costs.1 Several studies have examined the impact of these 
cost components on firms' employment, hours, and labor turnover 
decisions.2 Virtually no research has been directed, however, toward 
ascertaining how these costs vary across age cohorts of employees 
within a firm and how firms adjust to this variation. 
While it is obvious that the costs of term life insurance vary di-
rectly with age, it is less obvious how employers' contributions to 
pension funds, which comprise a major share of nonwage compensa-
tion, vary. As such, we focus in this paper on the most common variant 
of pension plans and demonstrate how an employer's cost of fully 
funding a plan varies with the age and service characteristics of his 
work force. This cost, as a percent of annual salary, is seen to increase 
with employees' ages and, in some cases, years of service. This varia-
tion has important implications for the level and shape of life-cycle 
earnings profiles, for labor turnover, and for the likely impact of 
pension reform legislation, such as the Employees Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), on the well-being of workers. These 
implications are discussed in this paper. 
* Financial support was provided by National Science Foundation grant SOC 
77-15800 to Ehrenberg. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at workshops at 
the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and Michigan State University. 
We are grateful to the participants at these workshops and to Robert Dorfman for their 
comments. 
1. In 1929 nonwage forms of compensation accounted for only 1.3 percent of total 
labor compensation, but by 1975 this figure had risen to 13.1 percent (U. S. Department 
of Commerce). Moreover, employer contributions to private pension funds alone ac-
counted for more than 3.4 percent of employees' compensation in the private nonag-
ricultural sector in 1973 (Ture, 1976). 
2. See, for example, Brechling [1977] and Ehrenberg [1971a, 1971b]. 
c 1979 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
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Pension plans can take many forms, but most can be categorized 
as either "defined contribution plans" or "defined benefit plans." 3 
In defined contribution plans, the amount of money contributed to 
an employee's account at each point in time is determined by such 
criteria as the employee's earnings or the firm's profits, or both. Under 
such plans the firm or its agent invests the pension contributions, and 
the employee receives no guarantee about the benefit levels that will 
be received upon retirement. The costs of defined contribution plans 
can be determined in a straightforward manner. 
Far more common than defined contribution plans, however, are 
defined benefit plans.4 In such plans, employees are guaranteed a 
pension of a given amount per year upon retirement. The benefit level 
is often a function of one or more factors, such as an employee's years 
of service and earnings profile over his or her tenure with the firm. 
The analysis presented in this paper differs in several ways from 
the actuarial computations that are typically carried out when defined 
benefit plans are established.5 Actuarial computations are usually 
carried out on a group basis since such computations generally offer 
cost savings for large firms. In contrast, we compute the costs for in-
dividual workers because rational employers should be influenced by 
the individual costs in their hiring and retention decisions. Actuarial 
formulas generally also use level funding (equal payments to the fund 
each year) to equalize the firm's burden over time; we, however, cal-
culate the economic costs during each period of time without regard 
to the timing of the actual funding. It is important to distinguish be-
tween the distribution of costs (accrued liabilities) and employer 
payments over time, and it is the former that should influence firms' 
decisions. Finally, we make simplifying assumptions throughout to 
facilitate the analysis. 
In the next two sections of the paper we develop models of the 
determinants of a firm's current net pension liability per employee 
for some of the most common forms of defined benefit plans. We show 
how these costs vary qualitatively with age and years of service and 
indicate the time profile of these costs under specific assumptions 
',]. In collectively bargained multi-employer plans both a contribution rate and 
benefit level are agreed to in the contract. Because the contributions will only rarely 
coincide with the benefits provided, either contributions or benefits or both must be 
adjusted periodically to keep the plan solvent. 
4. Recent unpublished estimates by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation 
indicate that approximately 70 percent of all private pension plans (excluding profit-
sharing plans) are defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans are also prevalent in 
the public sector. 
5. Latimer [1965) provides an example of an actuarial computation, and Hicks 
[1965] a discussion from an accountant's perspective. 
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about the parameters of the model. Section IV contains a discussion 
of the implications of the previous sections for labor market adjust-
ments and a discussion of how these adjustments will affect the ability 
of pension reform legislation, such as ERISA, to improve employees' 
well-being. Finally, Section V briefly discusses the difficulties involved 
in trying to establish "age-neutral" and "sex-neutral" pension 
plans—plans in which annual employer pension liabilities as a pro-
portion of salary are constant across age-sex cohorts of employees. 
Only such plans do not create incentives for employers to reduce 
employment or wages of female and older employees. 
II. A D E F I N E D B E N E F I T P L A N W I T H L E V E L W A G E S 
Defined benefit pension plan provisions6 are typically quite 
complex.7 For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we 
can specify a plan as being represented by the defined benefit: 
(1) B = KW*s. 
Here B represents an individual's annual retirement benefits, K is 
a constant that indicates the "generosity" of the plan, W* is some 
measure of average earnings over the individual's tenure with the firm, 
and .s is his years of covered service under the plan. To simplify the 
analysis, we also assume that participation in the plan begins at the 
date of hire (no waiting period), there are no breaks in service (e.g., 
temporary layoffs), administrative costs are zero, there are no special 
provisions for early retirement, there are no provisions for post-re-
tirement cost-of-living benefit increases, and finally, that there are 
no death, disability, "or health benefits in the plan prior to retire-
ment. 
A variety of measures of participant wages (W*) are used in de-
fined benefit pension plans. The most common measures are career 
average, last three or five years' average, and average of the three 
highest years. Some plans, including many collectively bargained 
multi-employer plans, do not include wages and are based entirely 
on years of service. As a benchmark, in this section we consider the 
case in which wages remain constant (W* equals W0, the starting 
wage); other wage profiles and various formulae for W* are considered 
in the next section.8 
6. The models of pension costs presented below are similar to those implicitly 
used by Weiss and Schiller [1976]. 
7. See U. S. Department of Labor [1974J. 
8. The results developed in this section also apply to plans that do not include 
the level of wages in the formula (i.e., W* equals 1 for them and K is a fixed dollar 
amount). 
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The first step in computing the employer's net pension costs is 
to determine the expected present value of the pension benefits as 
of the retirement age for an employee with s years of service. For a 
defined benefit plan with a benefit formula of the type described in 
equation (1), this is 
(2) VR = f °° Q{A)KW*se-^A-V dA = KW*sH, 
JR 
with 
" ~ Q(A)e-^A~RUA} »-£ 
where r is the interest rate and Q(A) is the probability that a retiree 
will survive from age R to age A. Consequently, H is the present value 
as of the retirement age of a lifetime annuity of $1 per period and VR 
is the expected present value of the pension benefits as of the retire-
ment age.9 
The expected present value of an employee's pension at any time 
prior to retirement is the discounted expected present value of the 
pension as of the retirement age adjusted for the possibility that the 
worker may die prior to retirement age (and therefore receive no 
pension) or may leave the firm before the pension becomes vested. 
For simplicity, we consider only full and immediate vesting here. If 
we let AQ denote the age at which the individual was first employed 
by the firm and P(A0,s) the probability that an individual will survive 
from age A0 + s to Rr then the expected present value of the em-
ployee's pension at any date is given by 
(3) V(A0,s) = PKW*sHE^A«+s-R\ 
and the rate of change of the expected value with respect to years of 
service by 
(4) ^ 
OS 
—I s + P + rPs 
ds 
KW* HeriAo+s~R) 
(dP\ (V\ 
= PKW*Her(A°+s~R) + r V + . 
\ ds/ \Pt 
9. VR could also represent the actual present value of benefits if the plan were 
structured in such a way that the actual present value of payments to a retiree plus the 
present value of the survivors' benefits paid to dependents were constant. For example, 
a plan in which survivors are paid a lump-sum benefit that declines with the number 
of years that the retiree drew benefits might satisfy these conditions. 
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The key variable of interest to us is the net contribution to the 
individual's "pension fund" that the firm must make at each point 
in time. If the pension fund is fully funded, this will equal the incre-
ment in the firm's pension liability. Crucially, this latter variable will 
not equal the rate of change of the expected present value of the in-
dividual's pension for two reasons. First, the firm will earn interest 
on contributions10 that it has previously made; for each individual 
this is simply the amount rV. Second, the firm "gets back" a fraction 
of its previous contributions when plan participants die prior to their 
retirement. These sums can then (due to the assumption of no death 
benefits prior to retirement) be distributed to the "accounts" of the 
survivors in each cohort, further reducing the current net contribution 
that the firm must make. The mortality rate for an age cohort at a 
point in time is simply (dP/dA)/P and the funds freed by a death is 
V. Since, holding the age at hire constant, each increment in years of 
service leads to an equal increment in age, the amount available to 
be redistributed to each survivor's account is (dP/ds)( V/P). As a re-
sult, the net contribution to an individual's pension fund that the firm 
must make at each point in time is 
(5) C(A,s) = — = rV - I—) M = PKW*Her<A~R\ 
where A(=AQ + s) is the individual's current age. 
Note that the individual's current age, but not his years of service, 
enters the contribution function. As such, the firm's pension costs 
increase with the employee's age but do not vary with years of service 
(holding age constant). Intuitively, the rationale for the former result 
is that older employees are closer to retirement and will have fewer 
periods to "earn" interest income on the funds in their pension ac-
counts. Thus, pension contributions must increase directly with 
workers' age to fund any given defined level of benefits. Although the 
probability of survival function influences this result, its impact is 
minor as a worker who has thirty years to go before retirement has 
more than an 80 percent chance of surviving to collect his pension. 
Rather, it is the "law of compound interest" that makes most of the 
10. The firm's net pension liability is further reduced by any employee contri-
butions to the pension fund. While plans that require employee contributions are 
prevalent in the public sector, they are rare in the private sector. Hence, for ease of 
exposition, we exclude employee contributions from the model. 
We should also stress that net contribution functions developed in this paper apply 
only to workers who remain with the firm. For workers who leave prior to retirement, 
subsequent increases in the firm's liabilities are exactly offset by the interest earned 
on previous contributions and the "returned contributions" from deceased em-
ployees. 
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TABLE la 
A N N U A L P E N S I O N C O N T R I B U T I O N R A T E S BY A G E ASSOCIATED W I T H A 
C O N S T A N T SALARY O F $ 6 , 0 0 0 / Y E A R 
Age 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
Contribution 
rate ($) 
71 
96 
131 
181 
252 
358 
523 
Contribution as a 
percent of salary 
1.18 
1.60 
2.18 
3.02 
4.20 
5.97 
8.72 
Ratio of costs to 
costs at age 35 
L00 
1.36 
1:85 
2.56 
3.03 
5.06 
7.39 
difference. An employee increases the value of his pension on retire-
ment day by the same amount for each day that he works in this 
model, regardless of the date when the work occurs. However, if the 
interest rate is 6 percent, each dollar of increase in the value of the 
annuity costs the employer only 170 if it is incurred thirty years before 
retirement, but a full dollar if it is incurred immediately prior to re-
tirement. 
If we define total compensation per employee as the sum of the 
firm's wage payment and net pension contribution, it is obvious that 
total compensation increases as employees' age but not as their years 
of service increase.11 Firms that offer employees flat life cycle wage 
profiles and a defined benefit pension plan might consequently be 
expected to have a structured internal labor market in which increases 
in productivity (with age) are "rewarded" through the increases in 
pension contributions. Alternatively, if the rate of growth of pro-
ductivity is smaller than the rate of growth of total compensation, the 
firm has an incentive to "encourage" workers to terminate their em-
ployment as they grow older. This need not necessarily be accom-
plished by explicitly firing older workers (age discrimination is illegal), 
but rather can be accomplished by taking actions that might increase 
the firm's employees' probabilities of quitting.12 
To illustrate the extent to which defined benefit pension plans 
actually affect compensation by age and years of service, we have 
calculated the net contribution function (5) for several representative 
plans. The survival function used in the calculation {P{A)) is obtained 
11. We ignore all other nonwage labor costs throughout the paper. 
12. The firm's optimal level of labor turnover is discussed in more detail in Section 
IV. 
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TABLE lb 
PKNSION C O S T S AS A P E R C E N T A G E OF SALARY WITH CONSTANT E A R N I N G S : 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
R/I 
55 
60 
65 
70 
0.03 
7.8 
5.5 
3.7 
2.3 
Age 35 
0.06 
3.2 
2.0 
1.2 
0.6 
0.09 
1.3 
0.7 
0.4 
0.2 
0.03 
15.3 
10.8 
7.2 
4.4 
Age 55 
0.06 
11.2 
7.1 
4.2 
2.3 
0.09 
8.7 
4.8 
2.5 
1.2 
Source of Table I: Authors' calculations based upon a defined-benefit plan with Wo = $6,000, K = 0.01, R = 
(if,, and r = 0.06. 
from the 1971 group annuity mortality table for males age 30 to 100.13 
Table la presents the pension cost data for a plan with an initial wage 
(Wo) of $6,000, a "generosity" parameter (K) of 0.01, a retirement age 
(R) of 65, and a discount rate (r) of 0.06. Contributions under this plan 
will be identical to contributions under a plan in which the defined 
benefit is independent of wages, and pension benefits simply accrue 
at a rate of $5 per month of service. 
It should be clear that pension costs are significantly higher for 
older workers. While the contribution rate is $71 (1.18 percent) at age 
35, it rises to $523 (8.72 percent) at age 65. This represents an increase 
of more than 600 percent. Congress may have recognized the potential 
adverse effects on the hiring of older workers such costs would have, 
as ERISA permits firms to exclude persons hired within five years of 
normal retirement age from pension coverage. This exemption does 
not, however, alleviate the cost differentials by age that exist for a 
firm's experienced labor force. 
To illustrate the sensitivity of our results to the specific as-
sumptions we have made, we report in Table lb net pension contri-
butions as a percentage of annual salary for males between ages 35 
and 55 for various values of the retirement age and discount rate. This 
table indicates that reducing the retirement age can substantially 
increase the firm's pension liability. Moreover, while changing the 
retirement age does not affect the ratio of pension costs at age 55 to 
costs at age 35, an increase in the discount rate does increase the cost 
disadvantage of older workers. 
13. Greenly and Keh [1972]. We use the group mortality tables (mortality rates 
for individuals covered by group insurance policies) rather than the individual mortality 
tables (rates for individuals covered by individual policies) because of the potential 
adverse selection problems involved with using the latter. Employed individuals will 
most likely be eligible for group policies. 
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It should be stressed that defined benefit pension plans do not 
customarily award full and immediate vesting, as is assumed above 
and in the following section.14 Under ERISA, pension plans must 
meet, or be more liberal than, one of three minimum vesting stan-
dards, and it is likely that the most widely used of the three will be full 
vesting after ten years of plan participation, because of this standard's 
ease of administration.15 Deferred vesting reduces employers' annual 
net pension contributions for employees whose pensions are not yet 
vested because some of these workers will leave the firm prior to 
vesting and the past pension contributions made on behalf of these 
employees will become available to be redistributed to the accounts 
of those employees who remain with the firm. Thus, deferred vesting 
greatly increases the pension cost differential between older workers 
and younger workers whose pensions have yet to be vested. As such, 
it exacerbates the effects noted above.16 
III. L I F E CYCLE W A G E G R O W T H 
We now generalize the model to allow for wage growth and as-
sume that wages grow over the life cycle at a rate of g percent per year. 
Hence, 
(6) W(s) = W0e8* 
One may continue to use equation (3) to calculate the expected 
present value of an individual's pension at any point of time. However, 
because W* is now a function of s, the net contribution function be-
comes 
(7) C(A0,s) = Iw* + J ^ H | PKHe«A°+°-R\ 
Clearly, the net contribution rate now increases with both age 
and years of service. To obtain more detailed information about these 
profiles' shapes requires one to specify the form that W* takes. The 
most common measure of W* used in pension benefit formulas is the 
employee's average salary over his lifetime and his average salary over 
the last n years of his service with the firm, with n most often taking 
14. U. S. Department of Labor [1974]. 
15. See Title I, Subtitle B, Section 203 of ERISA for the minimum vesting stan-
dards that it permits. 
16. Space constraints have prevented us from presenting a more complete dis-
cussion of deferred vesting here. Interested readers can consult an earlier version of 
the paper, Barnow and Ehrenberg [1977], for a more complete treatment. 
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on the values of three or five.17 We consider the lifetime average and 
final n years average salary rules in turn. 
When wages grow at an annual rate of g percent, the employee's 
average salary over his lifetime W*(s) is equal to (WJgs){egs — 1). 
Differentiating this expression with respect to years of service and 
then substituting into (7), one obtains 
(8) C(A,s) = WoPKHee*+rlA-R\ 
Unlike in the previous section, the net contribution rate now 
increases not only with age, but also with years of service (holding age 
constant). The latter result is not surprising as wages have been as-
sumed to increase with years of service. A more useful comparison is 
based upon the fraction (F) of the firm's total labor costs, defined here 
to be wages plus net pension contributions, that is devoted to pensions. 
This ratio C(A,s)/(C(A,s) + W(s)) is given by 
(9) F = PKHer<A-RV(l + PKHe^A~R^. 
This fraction also increases with age; however, with age held constant, 
it does not vary with years of service. That is, the percentage of 
compensation devoted to pension costs will be equal for employees 
of the same age, regardless of their years of service. 
To illustrate in more detail how pension costs vary with age and 
years of service, for a plan using lifetime average earnings as the 
measure of W*, we have made estimates for such a plan, once again 
assuming the following: K equals'0.01; Wo equals $6,000; r equals 0.06; 
and g equals 0.03. Table Ha presents the actual dollar cost rates by 
age and years of service, Table lib reports the comparable percentage 
figures, and Table lie tests the sensitivity of our results to the assumed 
values of the parameters. 
These tables indicate how pension costs increase with both age 
and years of service, increasing at a more rapid rate with the former. 
Moreover, pension costs continue to be an increasing share of total 
compensation for older workers. Furthermore, while changes in the 
growth rate of wages do not influence the ratio of pension costs to 
annual salary, decreases in the retirement age and the rate of discount 
both increase this ratio. Inclusion of deferred vesting in the model does 
not alter any of these results. 
In recent years, an increasing proportion of defined benefit plans 
have adopted some measure of terminal earnings in the benefit for-
mula. Such measures are popular with employees because they offer 
17. U. S. Department of Labor [1974]. 
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TABLE Ha 
A N N U A L P E N S I O N C O N T R I B U T I O N R A T E S BY A G E AND YEARS OF SERVICE: 
L I F E T I M E AVERAGE E A R N I N G S U S E D IN T H E B E N E F I T F O R M U L A 
Age/years 
of service 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
5 
82 
112 
153 
210 
293 
416 
608 
10 
130 
177 
244 
340 
483 
707 
15 
206 
283 
395 
561 
821 
20 
329 
459 
652 
954 
25 
553 
757 
1108 
30 
880 
1288 
35 
1496 
TABLE l ib 
P E N S I O N C O S T S AS A P E R C E N T A G E OF A N N U A L SALARY AND T O T A L 
C O M P E N S A T I O N BY AGE: L I F E T I M E AVERAGE E A R N I N G S U S E D IN T H E B E N E F I T 
F O R M U L A 
Contribution/ Contribution/total Ratio of current % total compensation in 
Age salary (%) compensation (%) pension cost to percent at age 35 
1.0 
1.3 
1.8 
2.4 
3.3 
4.7 
6.7 
TABLE He 
P E N S I O N C O S T S AS A P E R C E N T OF S A L A R Y - L I F E T I M E AVERAGE E A R N I N G S IN 
B E N E F I T FORMULA: S E N S I T I V I T Y ANALYSIS 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
1.2 
1.6 
2.2 
3.0 
4.2 
6.0 
8.7 
1.2 
1.6 
2.1 
2.9 
4.0 
5.6 
8.0 
55 
60 
65 
70 
i = 0.03 
7.8 
5.5 
3.7 
2.3 
Age 35 
i = 0.06 
3.2 
2.0 
1.2 
0.6 
i = 0.09 
1.3 
0.7 
0.4 
0.2 
i = 0.03 
15.3 
10.8 
7.2 
4.4 
Age 55 
i =0.06 
11.2 
7.1 
4.2 
2.3 
i =0.09 
8.7 
4.8 
2.5 
1.2 
Source of Table lla,b,c: Authors' calculations with K = 0.01, R = 65, r - 0.06, W& - $6,000, and g = 0.03. 
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partial protection for inflation that occurs over the employees' tenure 
with the firm.18 When the average wage over the last n years of service 
is used in the benefit formula, W* is given by 
(10) W* = ( - | fS W0e^dt= — |(e**-eS<*-">), 
\nl Js-n \gnj 
and consequently the net contribution rate formula by 
(11) C(A,s) = (l/n)(s + (l/g)M-l ~ e-ns)WoPKHe^+r(A-R)^ 
It should be obvious that the smaller the period used in calcu-
lating the benefits (n), the greater the employer's pension costs will 
be, as periods with lower earnings will be excluded from the calcula-
tion of benefits. Moreover, in contrast to the previous cases, pension 
costs do not comprise the same percentage of total compensation for 
all workers of a given age. Indeed, pension costs as a percentage of total 
compensation (or salary) increase with years of service, holding age 
constant. 
To illustrate the extent to which pension costs increase with age 
and years of service under such a plan, we have computed the costs 
using the average wage over the last three years in the benefit formula, 
again assuming that Wo equals $6,000, K equals 0.01, R equals 0.65, 
r equals 0.06, and g equals 0.03. The dollar cost and percentage of 
annual salary figures are reported in Table III and are quite 
striking. 
For a worker who joins the firm at age 30, pension costs are only 
1.3 percent of annual salary after five years. However, they rise to 17.1 
percent of salary by the time the worker reaches the assumed retire-
ment age of 65. Moreover, for workers of a given age, pension costs are 
a higher percentage of annual salary for workers with more years of 
service.19 For example, at age 55 this percentage would be 4.6 percent 
for a worker with five years of service but would grow to 7.0 percent 
for a worker with twenty-five years of experience. If worker produc-
tivity does not grow with firm-specific experience at a rate greater 
than g, one might expect the firm to offer a smaller percentage in-
crease in wages to its more experienced workers or attempt to induce 
them to leave the firm. Details of the reasoning behind this statement 
appear in the next section. 
18. In the United States, with the notable exception of social security, federal 
government retirement systems, and some state government retirement systems, it 
is rare that pension plans allow for•post-retirement inflationary adjustments. 
19. This result is due to our assumption that wages are a function of firm-specific 
experience and not age per se. However, as long as the return to firm-specific experience 
exceeds the return to other experience, the result will hold. 
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TABLE III 
ANNUAL PENSION CONTRIBUTION RATES AND CONTRIBUTIONS AS A PERCENT 
OF SALARY WITH THE AVERAGE OF THE LAST THREE YEARS' SALARY USED IN 
THE BENEFIT FORMULA 
Age 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
5 
91 
(1.3) 
123 
(1.8) 
168 
(2.4) 
231 
(3.3) 
322 
(4.2) 
457 
(6.6) 
669 
(9.6) 
10 
162 
(2.0) 
220 
(2.7) 
303 
(3.7) 
423 
(5.2) 
600 
(7.4) 
879 
(10.8) 
Years of service 
15 20 
285 
(2.0) 
393 504 
(4.2) (4.6) 
548 702 
(5.8) (6.4) 
778 997 
(8.3) (9.1) 
1138 1460 
(12.1) (13.3) 
25 
892 
(7.0) 
1267 
(10.0) 
1855 
(14.6) 
30 
1599 
(10.8) 
2340 
(15.9) 
35 
2933 
(17.1) 
Source: Authors' calculations with assumed values of K = 0.01, R = 65, r = 0.06, W0 = $6,000, andg = 0.03. 
Contributions as a percent of salary are in parentheses. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR M A R K E T A D J U S T M E N T S 
The results presented in the previous section indicate that em-
ployers' net pension contributions per employee will increase, both 
in absolute terms and as a percentage of the employee's salary with 
the employee's age and years of service. To the extent that employers 
control either employees' wages or nonwage conditions of employ-
ment, one would expect certain labor market adjustments to occur. 
One type of adjustment possible in competitive labor markets is that 
wages might adjust between firms to equalize employers' total com-
pensation of labor (wage costs plus net pension contributions).20 
Hence, firms with more generous pension plans would, other things 
equal, pay lower wages than firms with less generous, or no pension 
plans. The existence of'such "compensating wage differentials" has 
20. This is an oversimplification because we are considering the tradeoff only from 
the employer's perspective here. As Rosen [1974] has superbly demonstrated in another 
context, the observable market tradeoff between wages and pension benefits is de-
termined by the interaction of employers' and employees' preference. To incorporate 
the latter requires a more detailed model and raises a host of issues, such as the role 
of risk, tax treatments of pensions, differential rates of return on firm and individual 
investments, economies of scale in group provision of annuities, and the differential 
impact of pensions on turnover and turnover on productivity across firms, which we 
prefer to avoid here. 
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implications for the shape of workers' age-earnings profiles and the 
ability (or inability) of pension reform legislation, such as ERISA, to 
improve employees' welfare. 
A second type of adjustment might occur if employers do not 
have control over their wage structure in the short run, due to the 
existence of union contracts or other institutional arrangements. In 
this case, because of senior employees' relatively high pension costs, 
employers have an incentive to "encourage" employee turnover by 
varying working conditions and other nonwage characteristics of 
employment. Thus, more generous pension plans that increase the 
relative cost disadvantage of older workers may increase employee 
turnover rather than reduce it.21 
In general, adjustments will occur on both the wage and turnover 
dimensions. However, for the remainder of this section, we consider 
each adjustment separately and present specific simplified models 
that clarify the above remarks and suggest empirical implications. 
Consider first the wage adjustment case. For analytic simplicity 
we assume that W* is the individual's final wage (n equals zero) and 
individuals exhibit a constant probability 8 of dying in each period.22 
Under these assumptions, the net pension contribution function is 
given by 
(12) C(A,s) = ((WoK)/(r + 5))(1 + gs)e^e-^b^R-A\ 
If labor markets are competitive and each dollar the employer devotes 
to wages has the same impact on labor turnover and turnover costs 
as each dollar which he devotes to pension contributions, it must be 
the case that2 3 
(13) W(A,s,X) + C(A,s,X) = W{A,s,X), 
where W represents the wage function of firms without pension plans 
and X represents a vector of variables, other than age and years of 
service, which influence employees' wages in these firms. Substituting 
(13) into (12) yields after manipulation 
(14) W(A,S,X) =
 1 + (1+gs)/(r+S)Ke-{r+5)(R-A) ' 
21. This considers only the impact of pension plan provisions on employers' 
"demand" for labor turnover. A more complete analysis would incorporate a discussion 
of the impact of pensions on employees' "supply" of turnover. Schiller and Weiss 
[1976] present a supply-side oriented analysis of the problem. 
22. Thatis ,P(A0 , s) = _e-*<«-*>-*) and Q(A) = e-*<*-«>. 
23. See the qualifications in note 20. Whiting [1978] has investigated the possible 
impact of retirement system provisions per se on turnover and the implications this 
has for observed wage differentials. Cymrot [1978] has investigated the role of tax 
treatment of pension contributions. 
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No conclusions about the relationship between W and W can be 
drawn directly from this expression because the growth rate of em-
ployees' earnings (g) in firms with pensions is endogenous. However, 
at an employee's hire date (s = 0) 
W(AoAX) (15) W(A0,0,X) 1 + (Ke-(r+WR-Ao))/(r+8) 
Hence, as pension plans become more generous (represented in 
this simple model by higher values of K and lower values of R), 
starting salaries will decrease. Moreover, if we define £(s) to be the 
average annual growth rate of earnings during an employee's first s 
years of tenure with a firm that does not offer a pension, one can show 
after manipulation of (6), (14), and (15) that 
(16) 
Ke-(r+5)(R-A0) 
—
 p — {,r-to)(n — s — A0)\ — pgKS)s\-\ + 
(r + 5) ogs 1 +
: 
( r+S) 
Equation (16) implicitly specifies that the growth rate of earnings 
for an employee in a firm with a pension plan is a function of the 
growth rate of earnings in firms without pensions, the parameters of 
the pension plan, in this case K and R, the rates of discount and 
mortality, the employee's age at hire, and his current years of service. 
Moreover, it implies that more generous pension plans will reduce the 
growth rate of earnings, in addition to reducing starting salaries, and 
that the growth rate in firms with pensions must decline relative to 
growth rate in firms without pensions as years of service increase.24 
That is, the more generous the pension plan, the lower and flatter will 
be individuals' age-earnings profiles, ceteris paribus.25 Although we 
do not pursue the matter here, to the extent that one can identify the 
determinants of £• for an individual, equation (16), or variants of it 
based on more complex benefit plans, provides an implicit framework 
for the estimation of the tradeoff between wages and expected future 
pension benefits.26 Such estimates are necessary before one can 
evaluate the impact of pension reform legislation such as ERISA, on 
workers' overall welfare. 
24. It should be obvious that either g or £, but not both, can be constant. To keep 
our model logically consistent, we have allowed g{s) to vary with years of service. 
25. Lazear [1978] presents an alternative model in which by deferring payment, 
a firm may induce employees to perform at higher levels of effort. Such a model may 
lead to a positive association between pension plan coverage and life-cycle wage 
growth. 
26. Preliminary estimates of such tradeoffs for the public sector are presented 
by Ehrenberg [1978], and Gustman and Segal [1977], and for the private sector by Weiss 
and Schiller [1976], and Whiting [1978]. 
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Next consider the case when wage adjustments are not permitted. 
To further simplify the problem, we assume that (1) the firm must 
employ N employees each period; (2) employees are hired only at age 
"zero"; (3) there is no productivity or wage growth over the life cycle; 
(4) each employee exhibits a constant probability of Quitting (q) that 
does not vary with his age; and (5) layoffs are not permitted.27 Each 
period the firm hires no new employees. If we denote the number of 
employees with s years of service by n(s), the firm's fixed labor re-
quirement constraint implies that 
(17) N= I n(s)ds J *R 
-x R ' n0e-^+&)sds 
= (n0/ta + 5))<l-e-<«+*>«). 
Furthermore, since all new hires occur at age 0 (A0 = 0), and an 
employee's final wage appears in the benefit formula (n = 0), it is 
straightforward to show that the firm's total pension costs per period 
are given by 
(18) C*= C C(s)n(s)ds 
WonoK 
p-(r+d)R\p(r-q)R _ i l 
(r+b)(r-q)\e L J' 
Since a higher quit rate implies a lower average age for the firm's work 
force and pension costs increase with age, the firm's total pension costs 
per period will decrease as the quit rate increases. 
Crucially, we assume that the firm can control its quit rate by 
varying its working conditions and other nonwage conditions of em-
ployment and that it seeks to vary their levels so as to choose a quit 
rate which will minimize its total cost of labor.28 These costs consist 
of wage costs, pension costs, and new hire and turnover costs. Under 
the assumption of no life cycle wage growth, wage costs are indepen-
dent of turnover. However, due to the difficulties of integrating re-
placements into the production process or to the loss of morale, and 
hence productivity, that is associated with high turnover rates, the 
27. These assumptions are made primarily for expositional convenience. One can 
generalize the model to allow for wage and productivity growth and age-dependent 
quit rates. 
28. For analytical convenience, we assume that the factors which influence the 
quit rate can be varied at zero cost, and we ignore the impact of wages and pension 
benefits on workers' desire to quit; this latter aspect is the focus of Schiller and Weiss 
[1976]. 
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firm faces positive costs of hiring and training new employees. 
Moreover, it is likely that the marginal cost of new hires function is 
an increasing function. 
Since an increase in the quit rate reduces the firm's pension costs 
but increases its hiring and turnover costs, to minimize total labor 
costs the firm should choose its quit rate to equate the marginal sav-
ings in pension costs to the marginal increments in hiring and turnover 
costs. One can show that increasing the generosity of the pension plan 
(K) will increase the marginal savings in pension costs from increasing 
quits and will therefore lead to an increase in the optimal quit rate, 
as viewed from the employer's perspective. As a result, it will decrease 
the average age of the firm's work force.29 Again, knowledge of the 
magnitudes of such effects is necessary before one can conclude that 
more generous pension benefits unambiguously improve the welfare 
of older workers. 
V. CONCLUDING R E M A R K S 
Our results indicate that employers' net pension contributions 
per employee will in general increase both in absolute terms and as 
a percentage of the employees' salaries, with the employees' ages and 
years of service. Thus, the defined-benefit pension schemes we have 
looked at are not "age-neutral" because pension costs are higher for 
older workers in each of them. This creates incentives for firms to alter 
the shape of employees' age-earnings profiles and to encourage labor 
turnover. Any evaluation of the impact of union negotiated or leg-
islated improvements in pension benefits must attempt to measure 
the magnitude of these market adjustments. 
Unfortunately, it appears impossible to establish age-neutral 
pension plans that are of a defined-benefit nature. Proposals to 
eliminate age-related pension cost differentials by requiring em-
ployers to contribute a constant percentage of each worker's salary 
to a pension fund, thereby actuarially contributing "too much" for 
younger workers and "too little" for older workers, do not eliminate 
the problem.30 They confuse the distribution of funding by age with 
the distribution of accrued liabilities by age. An astute employer would 
realize that by encouraging turnover, he or she can reduce accrued 
liabilities and hence can reduce the constant (over age) percentage 
of salary that he or she must contribute to the pension fund. Conse-
29. Neglect of the relationship between pension plan provisions and employers' 
demand for turnover may partially explain the mixed results that Schiller and Weiss 
119761 obtain. 
;U). Such a proposal is cited in Schulz [1975]. 
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quently, the labor market adjustments we refer to would still be 
present. 
It also appears impossible to establish sex-neutral pension plans 
that are of a defined-benefit nature. Because females tend to live 
longer than males, they typically receive lower defined benefits per 
year than otherwise identical males, if the employer makes equal 
payments per dollar of wages for each sex. Alternatively, they may 
receive equal defined benefits per year as otherwise identical males, 
receive, which requires employers to make larger pension contribu-
tions for females. This latter situation would clearly give employers 
an incentive to reduce female employment.31 
One proposal to eliminate this incentive is to use "unisex" mor-
tality tables in the calculation of net employer pension contribution 
rates. Under such a scheme, an overall mortality rate table would be 
calculated based upon the proportion of employees of each sex em-
ployed by the firm. This table would then be used to calculate the 
equal net contribution rates for all employees of a given age necessary 
to fully fund equal pension benefits per year for otherwise identical 
males and females. Unfortunately, as Barbara Lautzenheiser [1976] 
has pointed out, employers would still have an incentive to reduce 
their share of female employment because such an action would re-
duce the average net contribution required for employees of each age. 
Over time, the share of jobs going to females would decline unless 
females agreed to accept proportionately lower wages. But if they did, 
we would be back to the wage adjustment case described earlier. 
To prevent these adjustments requires alternatives to defined-
benefit pension schemes. Defined contributions schemes, in which 
the employer contributes a fixed percentage of each employee's 
earnings, are clearly both age- and sex-neutral. However, such 
schemes promise employees a fixed contribution rate, not a fixed 
benefit rate, and increase their uncertainty about future benefits. This 
factor may explain the relative unpopularity of defined contribution 
schemes in the United States. One might conjecture though, that the 
passage of ERISA and its requirements for funding may encourage 
the spread of such plans. 
U.S. D E P A R T M E N T OF LABOR 
C O R N E L L U N I V E R S I T Y 
31. The April 25,1978, U. S. Supreme Court decisions in the Manhart case, which 
stated that employers who require females to contribute a greater proportion of their 
salaries than males to a contributory pension plan, are guilty of illegal sex discrimi-
nation, is clearly relevant here. Carried to its extreme, the same line of reasoning that 
the Court used may, if applied in a future case, prohibit plans in which females receive 
lower benefits than males after retirement. Hence, employers would be required to 
make larger percentage contributions for females. 
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